X-Forwarded-For Header Value Regex for Go
/^(?:(?:25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|1[0-9]{2}|[1-9][0-9]|[0-9])(?:\.(?:25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|1[0-9]{2}|[1-9][0-9]|[0-9])){3}|[0-9a-fA-F]{0,4}(?::[0-9a-fA-F]{0,4}){2,7})(?:\s*,\s*(?:(?:25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|1[0-9]{2}|[1-9][0-9]|[0-9])(?:\.(?:25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|1[0-9]{2}|[1-9][0-9]|[0-9])){3}|[0-9a-fA-F]{0,4}(?::[0-9a-fA-F]{0,4}){2,7}))*$/iWhat this pattern does
This page provides a comprehensive, battle-tested regular expression for matching x-forwarded-for header value, ported and verified for Go. A rigorously tested regex reduces debugging time and protects your application from edge-case failures. The snippet below is ready to drop into your Go project — whether you're validating in a Gin handler, a gRPC service, or a command-line tool.
Go Implementation
// X-Forwarded-For Header Value
// ReDoS-safe | RegexVault — Web & Network > HTTP
package validation
import "regexp"
var xforwardedforHeaderValueRe = regexp.MustCompile(`^(?:(?:25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|1[0-9]{2}|[1-9][0-9]|[0-9])(?:\.(?:25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|1[0-9]{2}|[1-9][0-9]|[0-9])){3}|[0-9a-fA-F]{0,4}(?::[0-9a-fA-F]{0,4}){2,7})(?:\s*,\s*(?:(?:25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|1[0-9]{2}|[1-9][0-9]|[0-9])(?:\.(?:25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|1[0-9]{2}|[1-9][0-9]|[0-9])){3}|[0-9a-fA-F]{0,4}(?::[0-9a-fA-F]{0,4}){2,7}))*$`)
func ValidateXforwardedforHeaderValue(s string) bool {
return xforwardedforHeaderValueRe.MatchString(s)
}
// Example
// fmt.Println(ValidateXforwardedforHeaderValue("192.168.1.1")) // trueTest Cases
Matches (Valid) | Rejects (Invalid) |
|---|---|
192.168.1.1 | not-an-ip |
203.0.113.1, 192.168.1.100 | 192.168.1.1, bad |
::1, 10.0.0.1, 203.0.113.5 | 256.0.0.1 |
2001:db8::1, 192.168.0.1 | 192.168.1.1;10.0.0.1 |
10.0.0.1,192.168.1.1,203.0.113.1 | 192.168.1.1, |
When to use this pattern
This pattern is drawn from the Web & Network > HTTP category and carries a ReDoS-safe certification. That matters for Go developers because Go's RE2 engine is inherently safe from catastrophic backtracking, but this pattern has been additionally verified for correctness. RegexVault audits patterns against known backtracking attack vectors, ensuring you have the necessary context before using this regex in a high-stakes production environment.
Common Pitfalls
Use Forwarded: (RFC 7239) instead of X-Forwarded-For in new deployments — it is standardized and harder to spoof. Parse from the rightmost IP you trust.
Technical Notes
The leftmost IP is typically the original client, subsequent IPs are proxies. Never trust X-Forwarded-For blindly — it can be spoofed by clients. Only trust it when set by a known, controlled proxy.
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